Adopting a postcolonial perspective, this article approaches Brazilian South-South cooperation 'narratives' in Africa as part of a politics of identity that helps redefine Brazil's place in the modern world. The article discusses how SouthSouth cooperation operates as a site of knowledge and power through which a developmentalist Brazilian identity is reproduced and subalternity can be constantly renegotiated. Through a brief analysis of the narratives of Brazilian involvement in Angola, it emphasizes how the production of the state self is also permeated by several ambivalences that update colonial tropes and bring new forms of subjugation. If, on the one hand, the movement undertaken in the article permits discussing the very ambiguity of the postcolonial conditionmainly by exposing the tensions and indeterminacies that permeate Brazil's engagements in the global arena -on the other hand, it opens up new theoretical avenues for analyzing Brazilian foreign policy.
ational-developmentalist narratives have been articulated in Brazil since the 1960s and have frequently been supported by projects of engagement with the so-called 'Third World'. If, on the one hand, these narratives have perpetuated the notion of an unequal and dependent peripheral development, on the other, they have contributed to consolidating a form of foreign policy thinking in which structural determinants, a lack of power resources, and economic dependence, as proposed by Lima (2013) , should not be conceived as a limitation to redefining Brazil's role in the modern international system. From this perspective, the so-called 'turn to Africa ' (FRAGOSO, 1981) emerged, in the 1970s, as a strategy for the country's international engagement, allowing decision-makers to renegotiate Brazilian dependence within world capitalism. The symbolic claims for alternative partnerships reveal the (re)production of a developmental imaginary in which inequalities and hierarchies of power can be negotiated and mitigated. However, it should be emphasized that the expansion and pluralization of SSC practices did not eliminate several of the challenges characteristic of traditional cooperation schemes. In fact, SSC has elicited a number of criticisms concerning the effects generated by technology and knowledge ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 For Emma Mawdsley (2012) , the terms 'new', 'emerging' or even 'non-traditional donors' are problematic and ahistorical, portraying co-operation as a recent phenomenon -which is not the case, since many Southern countries that make up the list of donors in the 2000s have been engaged in cooperation initiatives since at least the 1950s. See Mawdsley (2012, p. 05) . This article aims to discuss how 'narratives' of South-South Cooperation between Brazil and Africa, notably Angola, have a productive aspect that at the same time allows Brazil to reinterpret the linear 'telos' of modernization logic, to rearrange its own temporal and spatial development and, ultimately, to 'renegotiate' its identity representations within the international system. showing how these very narratives work to update colonial and hierarchical tropes. In this regard, narratives of SSC are intrinsically ambiguous. Even though Brazil's SSC narratives demarcate a clear difference in relation to traditional cooperation schemes between North and South, their intent to transfer knowledge and capacities to those that do not possess them depends on an original and hierarchical distinction between a self that proclaims to hold an 'exclusive knowledge' (INAYATULLAH, 2014) and an 'other' that lacks it (INAYATULLAH, 2014) . Brazilian narratives of SSC can be seen as informed by a colonial cultural imaginary that, according to postcolonial thinkers, is constantly reinvented though hierarchical dichotomies such as donor/receiver, even after the end of formal colonialism. As emphasized by Inayatullah (2014) , by claiming to have 'exclusive knowledge', 'givers' place themselves on the top, as the superior being, hiding their own doubts and insufficiencies (INAYATULLAH, 2014, p. 466) . As argued in this article, it is precisely this colonial way of thinking that enables Brazil to speak from 'Two Brazils': Renegotiating Subalternity Through South-South Cooperation in Angola (2019) 13 (1) e0007 -4/34
an authoritative locus of enunciation, albeit with an empathetic and fraternal tone.
The article is structured in three parts. The first part presents a postcolonial reading of development that, through historicization, questions its universal, natural and objective character. Starting from a debate about the colonial roots of the sequentialist imaginary of development, it aims to expose precisely its provincial character and, thus, to point to its inherent spatial and temporal situatedness. It argues, on the one hand, that the teleological narrative informing the idea of development consolidates hierarchies and violences that get reproduced within SSC. On the other hand, it emphasizes how this fact does not exclude multiple possibilities of resistance, ambivalence and hybridity. The second part of the article seeks to understand Brazilian SSC through the perspective of a situated post-colonialism, which considers the ambivalence of the Brazilian colonial experience in its attempts to reconcile antagonisms, producing the hybrid interrelation of 'two Brazils': one belonging to the past (to backwardness), and another destined to the future (to progress). In order to discuss how narratives of SSC with Africa contributes to the (re)production of a specific representation of the Brazilian self, the third part of the article analyze some governmental discourses and practices related to the engagement of Brazil in
Angola. This analysis allows us to understand how SSC not only works to (re)produce but also to renegotiate the developmentalist image of Brazil, no longer assigning it an unequivocal peripheral and subaltern place in contemporary modernity. By exploring South-South cooperation as a specific locus of power and knowledge, this article aims to emphasize the tensions and ambivalences that have permeated Brazil's engagement in the field of development over the last decade. It is hoped that this postcolonial problematization will contribute not only to exploring the indeterminacies of Brazil's cooperation policies but also to stimulating the study of Brazilian foreign policy beyond dominant theoretical perspectives. and underdevelopment to modernity and development follows through a 'natural' and, therefore, universal sequence -which leads to the twin assumption that all cultures and societies are supposed to go through the same stages (see BLANEY and INAYTULLAH, 2004) . In this section, we draw on the contributions of Beate Jahn (1999 ), Dispesh Chakrabarty (2000 , Ashis Nandy (1989) , Aníbal
Quijano (2000) and Achille Mbembe (2018) to argue that the construction of such a developmentalist imaginary is tied to the colonial encounter.
According to Jahn (1999) , the state of nature, as an epistemological premise, has its roots on the political encounter between Europe and the Amerindians. From this point, she claims, the narrative of the state of nature has provided a historical and secular basis on which to build arguments in defense of 'natural' law that are at the heart of a universalist conception of society. By removing the state of nature from cultural anonymity, Jahn (1999) claims that what the concept ultimately contains is a view of those aspects of human life which are unsociable -or socially indomitable -and that could only be made to seem 'natural' through an intensive process of intellectual construction. In this sense, the state of nature should not be understood as pre-existing the emergence of the socio-cultural ties that underlie its moral discourse; rather, it is the product of a historical event and of a particular intellectual production, which emerges in and through the colonial encounter. By placing the self and the other in different stages of a linear temporality, this foundational myth allowed Europe to see itself at the peak of human civilization, as the cradle of humanity, and to occupy a position from where it could establish a range of hierarchies. In an attempt to explain the displacement of humanity from one stage of development to another, European intellectuals justified and naturalized the particular European pattern of development -whose pillars go back to the construction of the state, private property and money (JAHN, 1999, p. 423) . 'Two Brazils': Renegotiating Subalternity Through South-South Cooperation in Angola (2019) 13 (1) e0007 -6/34
Established since the colonial encounter, this intellectual history is informed by a teleological historicism that claims that all societies should go through necessary and successive stages of development. According to Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) , since the end point of such a historical trajectory has rested on Europe, the academic reproduction of this developmentalist imaginary through particular kinds of policies works to naturalize Europe as the primary locus of capitalism, modernity and the Enlightenment -thus placing the rest of the world always one step behind this supposed 'first' experience. In fact, it is impossible to think about 'political modernity' -that is, modern state institutions, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise -without invoking certain categories and concepts, without using genealogies deeply rooted in the European intellectual traditions.
A certain 'inequality of ignorance ' (CHAKRABARTY, 2000, p. 28) , marked by the lack of attempts to produce historical knowledge by societies beyond Europe, has supported the creation of universalist theories that presume to embrace the whole of humanity. Considering these societies as objects, rather than subjects of knowledge -empirical constructs to be captured by mainstream theories -these teleological narratives have been offered as ways to overcome the intermediary phase of transition from underdevelopment to (European-like)
development. The reproduction of this narrative of transition has led to the subalternization of knowledges produced by less developed countries and, consequently, to the consolidation of the idea that European thought is universal, transcendental and resilient.
Looking at such differences separating the histories produced in Europe and those produced elsewhere, Chakrabarty (2000) If, on the one hand, the coding of differences through race made it possible to biologically allocate a 'natural' stage of inferiority to the colonized, on the other, race was authorized by biological-scientific discourse to structure the entire system of domination required by colonization. The kind of social ranking enabled by the new structure of power in the Americas -which was later expanded throughout the world -allowed for articulating the ethnic-racial hierarchy with the international division of labor, so that "all forms of control and exploitation of labor and production, as well as the control of appropriation and distribution of products, revolved around the capital-salary relation and the world market" (QUIJANO, 2000, p. 535) . New historical and social identities were produced and combined with a racist distribution of labor and exploitation of colonial capitalism.
According to Quijano (2000) , this configuration was achieved "through a quasi- Contributing to this everyday (re)production of colonial alterity by modernity, development policies enabled the constant classification of modernity as exclusively European, and of colonialism as exclusively Third Worldist. Once colonization is understood as a 'necessary evil' for societies to achieve maturity, development can analogously be seen as fundamental for making them more ethical, productive and rational. However, as highlighted by Jahn (1999) , Chakrabarty (2000) , Nandy (1989) , Quijano (2000) and Mbembe (2018) , modernity and colonialism operate simultaneously, being part and parcel of the
creation of a European imaginary that shapes the entire geopolitics of knowledge, allowing for an ethnocentric epistemological colonization (MIGNOLO, 2003) .
Offering little room for the agency of the 'Third World' within modernity, and different to the perspective proposed here, Arturo Escobar (1995) problematizes the hegemonic idea of development by conceiving it as mechanism of knowledge/power that "has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World" (ESCOBAR, 1995, p. 09) . The discourse of development that emerged after the Second World War is understood by Escobar (1995) Given that colonialism is a 'state of mind', in Nandy's terms (1989) , the subjugation of the 'Third World' through development is effected not only in the asymmetric relations between North and South but also among the countries of the South themselves, insofar as they are influenced by a linear and Eurocentric imaginary, which allows some to be recognized as more developed than others. In this way, the internalization of the effects of colonization on individual, local, cultural, linguistic and political practices also extends to SouthSouth relations.
Although one cannot escape already-inhabited modernity, the ambivalence of developmental narratives, as emphasized by Ilan Kapoor ( ...decision-makers have the opportunity to choose and the intention of choosing between different international strategies: between a more autonomous type of development or a more dependent one; in security terms, between bandwagoning and balancing; when building a multilateral policy, between traditional alliances and innovative, flexible coalitions; in geopolitical terms and in the field of development cooperation, between an emphasis on North-South or an emphasis on South-South relations (MILANI, PINHEIRO and LIMA, 2017, p. 585 ).
Based on exogenous criteria defined by Western organizations such as the World Bank, the graduation of a country means a change in its economic status.
To Milani, Pinheiro and Lima (2017) , emerging nations, like Brazil, fear and seek to avoid reaching this level, since once they have 'graduated' they lose a range of
rights and benefits. According to the authors, the concept of graduation simplifies the heterogeneity of countries since in all the different framings of graduation "there is a sense of purpose and direction to human progress, and an idea of expansion, improvement and development which is associated with an individual agent, be it a human being, a local community, a region or a nation-state" (Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, 2017, p. 590) . Thus this notion of 'graduation', as problematized by the authors, is in line with the Western development imaginary informed by a linear understanding of history, "as though once a country has graduated it is at no risk of losing its economic capacity and power projection resources again" (MILANI, PINHEIRO and LIMA, 2017, p. 591) .
The embrace of the African Other in the very constitution of Brazilian identity has allowed Africa to be seen as sharing a cultural existence that is valued by Brazil. By engaging in such a strategy of representation, Brazil also reveals the ambiguities that permeate its place in the great chain of modernization theories, and its own ambivalent condition as an emerging power from the South (FERNÁNDEZ and GAMA, 2016, p. 73) . Therefore, "instead of adopting the colonial strategy of establishing a well-demarcated frontier between self and other, Brazil recognizes its liminal condition and the presence of internal/African others in its self" (FERNÁNDEZ and GAMA, 2016, p. 72 ).
However, as will be argued in the following pages, by accepting this projection of a 'teenage' country, Brazil ends up reproducing the European narratives and highlighting a supposed immaturity of African societies. After all, the modern idea of childhood -understood as a 'tabula rasa' where adults inscribe their moral codes -has a direct relationship with the doctrine of progress prevailing in the West. According to Nandy (1989) , the modern conception of childhood as an inferior, less productive and less ethical version of maturity, authorizes the adult (or in this case, the adolescent) to 'save' the child by socializing it. In fact, for Letícia Cesarino (2012) , Brazil has rearranged the theory of modernization in a double movement. On the one hand, it reproduces its teleological grammar by assuming that the path taken by a more developed part of the periphery (Brazil) can somehow inform the path of a less developed one (Africa). On the other hand, Brazil, as seen in its cooperation with Angola, claims to have historically accumulated forms of knowledge capable of offering alternative solutions, which are better than those offered by the traditional powers. In this sense, the following section will address Brazil's attempt to renegotiate its own development and subalternity, emphasizing how its narrative is based on ambivalences and contradictions characteristic of its postcolonial experience.
Renegotiating Brazilian subalternity in south-south cooperation with Africa
Recent international development cooperation policies undertaken by However, for Cesarino (2012) , interpretations of the construction of modern Brazil mostly end up favoring modernizing elitist projects that, even when recognizing the plurality (and contradiction) of temporalities and spaces that coexist within the Brazilian nation, do not allow meaning and subjectivity to be attributed In any case, the reading of Brazilian modernity proposed by Cesarino Portuguese colonialism, featuring a semiperipheral country, was also semiperipheral itself. It was, in other words, a subaltern colonialism. Portuguese colonialism was the result both of a deficit of colonization -Portugal's incapacity to colonize efficiently -and an excess of colonization -the fact that the Portuguese colonies were submitted to a double colonization: Portugal's colonization and, indirectly, the colonization of the core countries (particularly England) of which Portugal was a dependent (often in a near colonial way) (SANTOS, 2002, p. 10 In characterizing the identity of the Portuguese colonizer as 'doubly double', Santos argues that " [it] does not simply include the identity of the colonized other" (SANTOS, 2002, p. 17) . This means that Portuguese identity was itself colonized as a colonizer of another (SANTOS, 2002) ; the double ambivalence of its representations affected and continues to affect not only its own identity as colonizer, but also the identities of its colonized subjects (SANTOS, 2002) .
Additionally, the ambivalence of Portuguese identity and Luso-colonialism finds its expression, according to Santos (2002) , in the form of its racism. To claim that miscegenation was a Portuguese humanist triumph was a long-standing strategy for locating Portugal uncomfortably inside European space-time. Santos (2002) argues, however, that since miscegenation was loathed by the other European colonial powers, Portuguese culture came to be constituted as a heterogeneous This perspective on Portuguese hybridity is also linked, according to Santos (2002) , to the very fragility of the institutional colonial authority exercised by Portugal, especially in African territories. Until the nineteenth century, "the Portuguese had to negotiate everything, not only trade but also survival itself. The Portuguese 'colonizer' was often in the situation of having to pay allegiance to the local king" (SANTOS, 2002, p. 26 Thus, it must be emphasized that Portuguese colonization was as cruel as any colonial enterprise: it reinforced the homologization between masculine/feminine, primitivism/childhood and growth/development. To the extent that colonization also affects the colonizer, 'undecidability' becomes a common denominator of all processes of representation; it becomes part of the construction of the self as always fractured, ambiguous and hybrid (BHABHA, 1994) . This is precisely what allows for agency and resistance to irrupt in the independence movements.
Despite the short duration of its colonial hegemony in the sixteenth century, the representations and systems of signs inscribed by Portuguese colonization lasted so long that they eventually gave rise to stereotypes and myths "that reciprocally reinforce and cancel each other" (SANTOS, 2002, p. 24) . In the would, therefore, lead to a "rearrangement" of the developmentalist temporality of modernity (CESARINO, 2012, p. 105), which improves Brazil's position in it.
While Cesarino (2012) emphasizes the influence of a Brazilian 'lusotropical' civilizing mission on cooperation policies, André Cicalo (2012) relativizes this argument by affirming the discontinuity of such narrative.
According to Cicalo (2012) narrative of historical debt, was to officially strengthen relations on bases of relative equality and reciprocity. At least in Itamaraty's discourse, Brazil appears less like a "bridge between the poor of the South" and the "civilized rich of the North", and more as a "partner" who, together with Africa, can build a fairer path to development (CICALO, 2012, p. 11) . In this perspective, Brazil came to reaffirm its identity as part of the 'global South', especially by breaking with an interventionist/imperialist imaginary.
These different interpretations by Cesarino (2012) and Cicalo (2012) about the narratives supporting SSC should not be read as the result of a discursive change merely adopted in order to legitimize Brazil's strategic actions, guided by previous, well-defined interests. Considering that discursive articulations are not 
Mirror games: an analysis of the narrative of Brazilian cooperation in Angola
And one day a Brazilian journalist, not necessarily very well informed, asked: "Minister, why do you pay so much attention to South America?" (...). I said: "Because I live here. If I lived elsewhere, if I lived in Europe, perhaps I would pay more attention to Europe, but I am here in South America, I live here in South America". And I think that, about Africa, we can say, by making an exchange: Africa lives here. So the main reason for Brazil to pay attention to Africa -there are many others: economic, strategic, political -but this is the main one: Africa lives in Brazil. It lives in us (MARCONDES and KHALIL, 2015, p. 17) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) and Defense (2011 Defense ( -2014 , in a lecture held in São Paulo, on May 26, 2015, during the 5th Seminar 'Conversations about Africa'. is added, authors' translation. 6 In addition to the six Portuguese-speaking countries mentioned above, the CPLP also brings together East Timor, Portugal and Brazil. 7 The policy of relief and renegotiation of approximately US$ 900 million in debts from eleven African countries was undertaken alongside the opening of the market for Brazilian companies known as 'national champions'. Their sales have already exceeded by more than twenty times the amount that was written off in debts for the purchasing countries. According to Itamaraty, this is not a gesture of "Brazilian voluntarism, but a internationally concerted practice, with clear objectives to allow for the debt burden not to become an im p edim en t to econ om ic growth and overcoming poverty". Nonetheless, the expansion of investments by Brazilian companies and commerce more than quadrupled between 2003 and 2013, jumping from US $ 6.1 billion to US $ 28.5 billion. Data provided in a press release by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE We have invested in a broad program of technical cooperation aimed at sharing experiences that have been successful in Brazil. One of the emphases has been agriculture, reflecting the perception of the existence of great potential in this area, and the wide knowledge acquired in Brazil, in overcoming agricultural challenges through applied research. The concern for health is also the result of the interest in designing, on African soil, success stories identified among Brazilian public policies, such as actions to combat HIV/AIDS and falciform anemia (PATRIOTA, 2013, pp. 237-245) . If Patriota's speech (2013) In a press statement, in June 2014, during a bilateral meeting with the President of Angola, President Dilma Rousseff stated that (...) Brazil wants to continue supporting and participating in Angolan industrial development. We agree that the current business approach has already paid off. Here in Brazil, the Angolan Sonangol Starfish is the sixth oil producer. The airline Taag operates daily flights between São Paulo, Rio and Luanda. Several Brazilian companies are active in the expansion of infrastructure, both in Angola's road and energy infrastructure. Among them are Odebrecht, the country's largest private employer, Biocon, Petrobrás, Camargo Corrêa, Queiroz Galvão and Andrade Gutierrez. We emphasize the role of the BNDES in the concession of credits to exports of Brazilian goods and services to Angola, which were renewed this month. (…) We also instruct our ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 13 As the largest private employer in Angola, Odebrecht controls activities ranging from agribusiness and the development of biofuels to the management of a supermarket chain. Petrobras is, in turn, engaged in the exploration of offshore oil fields in the country, and since June 2013 it has been working in a joint venture with BTG Pactual Bank (50%) for US $ 1.5 million for oil and gas exploration in several African nations, including Angola. Also present in the Angolan heavy construction market, we find the companies Andrade Gutierrez (responsible for 18% of the projects on the list), Queiroz Galvão (14%) and Camargo Corrêa (9% governments to conclude bilateral reciprocal investment facilitation agreements. We want to highlight the progress of our defense cooperation. The National Air Force of Angola acquired, in 2009, six Super Tucanos aircrafts, which have been already delivered. The Ministry of Defense has collaborated to build the Angolan continental platform. I have expressed Brazilian interest in forming new partnerships in the naval industry, with local production and technology transfer. We welcome the continuity of our educational cooperation, which we consider of immense relevance to both Brazil and Angola 16 .
As seen in the president's address, by operating through demand-driven diplomacy 17 Brazil's SSC discourse exposes the ambiguities and tensions that permeate its development efforts. Brazil's situated post-colonialism allowed for the constitution of a development model based on the state's alliance with elite private interests, marked by attempts to reconcile its slaveholding heritage with Western liberal ideology. Thus, the desire to promote technical cooperation that allows more inclusive development for African countries coexists with the diverse political and economic interests of business elites that see internationalization as allowing them to pursue the project of constructing the 'Brazil of the future'. In this sense, Brazilian cooperation policies are themselves constitutive of this aporia: they reflect the impossibility of carrying out a single and well-defined strategic action, since the actors involved and interests at stake in the formulation and implementation of public policies are always multiple, variable, and contested.
Moreover, the success of the Brazilian narrative is not only the result of Brazil supposedly offering a model with fewer conditionalities and, consequently, greater material gains, but also because the reaffirmation of a cultural and ideological proximity between the two countries allows for Angolan decision-makers to feel recognized and represented in Brazil's cooperation discourse -even if the latter projects the desires and aspirations of certain business elites at the same time. 
Final remarks
This article has sought to expose the tensions and ambivalences that permeate the 'narratives' of Brazilian engagement in international cooperation for development. Based on the analysis of discourses and images mobilized by Brazil in relation to Africa, and particularly in relation to South-South Cooperation with Angola, we argued that Brazil seeks to renegotiate its position in modernity.
Without questioning the linearity that informs the imaginary of development and, consequently, the hierarchies (tradition/modernity, underdeveloped/developed) derived from the temporal separation of peoples and states, Brazil attempts to resituate its place in the developmentalist continuum. This repositioning is articulated through a temporal trope that, for instance, discursively constructs Brazil as a 'teenage' country, temporally close to an immature Africa, but also not so distant from an adult and rational United States or Europe. In its discourses of cooperation with the African continent, through a dialectical movement, Brazil projects itself as a country that understands and identifies with Africa, that contains Africa within its multicultural and multiethnic identity (as we have seen in relation to Angola), but at the same time, that has surpassed Africa qualitatively, and thus temporally. Brazil overcomes African countries and affirms its authority over them by claiming to have a subaltern knowledge that supposedly enables it to understand local realities and to give voice to the demands of historically marginalized populations (through demand-driven diplomacy).
Even while adopting the teleological narrative of development that, as we have seen, springs from the colonial encounter, Brazil subverts it by resignifying its starting and finishing points. Instead of thinking of the African continent as a presocial and pre-cultural state of nature, Brazil mirrors itself in Africa, valuing it socially and culturally. On the other hand, Brazil wants to modernize, but through an alternative modernization that is not based upon interventionist and imperialist behavior.
However, far from resolving these tensions in its identity through a harmonious synthesis of races and cultures, as popularized by the idea of racial democracy, Brazil continues to violently treat its internal Others and to hierarchize its two Brazils (one facing the past and the other facing the future). In this sense, the emphasis on Brazil's debt to Africa, referred to in several foreign policy speeches during the 2000s, cannot be reduced to a debt that is located in a distant past of slavery, but must be thought about as a debt that overflows to the present, and whose actuality, if taken into consideration, brings us closer to the violent and exclusionary colonial imaginary from which we have tried so hard to distance ourselves.
We have shown how many of the ambiguities of Brazilian cooperation discourses mirror the ambivalent colonial experience of Portugal, which, located in 
